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Abstract
We investigate how diﬀerences in set-up costs of various types af-
fect the trade-oﬀ between global eﬃciency and spatial equity and show
that the standard assumption of symmetry in ﬁxed costs masks the
existence of an interesting eﬀect: the range of available varieties varies
depends on the spatial distribution of ﬁrms.In such a setting, even
when the market outcome leads to excessive agglomeration under sym-
metric ﬁxed costs, a planner opts for asymmetric ﬁxed costs and more
agglomeration.The reason is that the losses induced by more agglom-
eration are oﬀset by the gains due to additional product variety.
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11 Introduction
There are multiple costs associated with the launching of a new business.
They range from ﬁxed production costs, specialized infrastructure (such as
those needed to load and unload cargo) and land on which plants are built,
on the one end of the spectrum, to legal procedures, registration fees and
administrative delays, on the other.There is no doubt that all these costs
considerably vary across countries.Besides diﬀerences in technologies and
land rents, administrative set-up costs also exhibit a high degree of variation.
Indeed, as observed by Djankov et al. (2002, p.1) “for starting to operate
a business in Mozambique, an entrepreneur must complete 19 procedures
taking at least 149 business days and pay US$256 in fees.To do the same, an
entrepreneur in Italy needs to follow 16 diﬀerent procedures, pay US$3,946
in fees and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the necessary permits.
In contrast, an entrepreneur in Canada can ﬁnish the process in 2 days by
paying US$280 in fees and completing only 2 procedures”.
Low set-up costs and easy entry for ﬁrms seem to be a signiﬁcant determi-
nant of entrepreneurial dynamism, international location decisions, and eco-
nomic performance in general (GEM, 2002; European Commission, 2002).
Hence, an ‘entrepreneurial deﬁcit’ due to complicated and costly entry may
constitute an important handicap for a country, damaging its long-run eco-
nomic development.This is clearly recognized by the European Commis-
sion, which recently pointed out that the most important reasons for the
European Union’s (henceforth, EU) perceived ‘entrepreneurial deﬁcit’ are
as follows: “it is the combination of lengthy and complex procedures and
signiﬁcant cost and capital requirements that is likely to act as the great-
est barrier to the formation of new Private Limited Companies” (European
Commission, 2002, p.75).Further, it is a well-know fact that there are less
‘business angels’ and venture capital in Europe, thus making the creation of
high risk start-ups potentially more diﬃcult than in the US.For example,
in 1999, total venture capital invested in the US amounted to US$40.6 bil-
lion, whereas the corresponding ﬁgure for Europe was only US$10.8 billion
(GEM, 2000, p.46).
In this paper, we investigate how diﬀerences in set-up costs of various
types aﬀect the trade-oﬀ between global eﬃciency and spatial equity in an in-
creasingly integrated space-economy such as the EU (Ottaviano and Thisse,
2002).To do so, we build on the observation that diﬀerences in technologies
and factor endowments between EU countries are relatively small, whereas
diﬀerences in set-up and entry costs, as well as in entrepreneurial dynamism
and business culture, remain relatively large (European Commission, 2002;
2GEM, 2000).This suggests to focus on a setting in which variable produc-
tion costs are the same across countries, whereas ﬁxed and entry costs diﬀer
between them.More concretely, we develop a two-country model of trade
with mobile capital, which incorporates both diﬀerences in market size as
well as in set-up costs within the same framework.This allows us to eval-
uate their relative importance in generating spatial patterns of production
and trade.It is worth noting that the standard assumption of symmetry
in set-up costs masks the existence of an interesting eﬀect: the range of
available varieties varies with the spatial distribution of ﬁrms when they do
not operate under identical ﬁxed costs in both countries.When ﬁxed costs
are the same across countries, we will see that the market outcome always
leads to excessive agglomeration.Yet, when the planner can choose to make
these ﬁxed costs asymmetric, she quite surprisingly opts in favor of stronger
spatial inequalities because the welfare loss associated with them is more than
oﬀset in terms of gains due to product variety.Hence, more agglomeration
may be socially desirable when compared with the symmetric setting, even
in the absence of purely Marshallian externalities that play a central role in
explaining the spatial concentration of activity (Krugman, 1991).
The secondary purpose of this paper is to asses the robustness of the pre-
diction known as the ‘home market eﬀect’ (henceforth, HME): everything
else being equal, large countries attract a more than proportional share of
ﬁrms in industries characterized by imperfect competition, increasing re-
turns to scale, and trade costs (Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman,
1985; Head et al., 2002).Our results show that diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs
may dampen the HME, a direct implication of this being that the har-
monization promoted by the European Commission may well exacerbate
economic diﬀerences between countries when they diﬀer suﬃciently in size.
Since size is obviously one of the few aspects that are deﬁnitely beyond the
reach of harmonization, somewhat paradoxically, countries may well become
more diﬀerent the less diﬀerent they strive to become.This question is part
of the larger debate on whether harmonization in general (e.g., tax rates,
ﬁscal policy, institutional aspects) may lead to an increasing polarization
of the economic landscape, a question that has recently become even more
pressing in the wake of the EU’s eastern enlargement.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.In Section 2, we
present the model.Section 3 discusses the market outcome and shows that
a mean-preserving deviation in ﬁxed costs in favor of the smaller country
decreases the total mass of varieties produced in the global economy.Sec-
tion 4 then analyzes the ﬁrst-best outcome and shows that the market out-
come provides excessive agglomeration under symmetric ﬁxed costs, whereas
3the planner will choose to increase agglomeration in the asymmetric setting
because consumers have access to a wider array of varieties.Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy formed by 2 countries, labeled H and F, and a unit
mass of consumers.We choose the units of labor and capital for each con-
sumer to be endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital.Let
0 <θ<1 denote the share (and mass) of consumers, labor, and capital in
country H.Because we rule out the case of symmetric countries, we may
assume that θ>1/2, i.e., H is the large country.Consumers are immo-
bile and supply labor locally, whereas capital is perfectly mobile and can be
supplied anywhere.While θ is exogenously given, the share 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1o f
capital invested in country H is determined endogenously.
All consumers have the same quasi-linear preferences with quadratic sub-
utility over the consumption of two types of goods, a homogeneous good Z
and a continuum of mass N of horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties (Otta-



























i Zi = ri + wi + pZ
i Z0
where qi(v) and pi(v) are the consumption and price of variety v; Zi and
pZ
i are the consumption and price of the homogeneous good; ri is the rental
rate of capital; wi is the wage; α>0, β>γ>0 are utility parameters.
Turning to technologies, good Z is produced under constant returns and
perfect competition with labor as the only input.Without loss of generality,
we normalize the unit input requirement to 1.Each diﬀerentiated variety
is produced under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition
with a constant marginal requirement m of labor and a country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed requirement φi of capital.The diﬀerence in ﬁxed capital requirement
φH − φF can be thought of as approximating the diﬀerences in set-up costs
and entry conditions.
In what follows, we denote by ni the mass of ﬁrms located in country
i = H,F.Due to the ﬁxed input requirement, capital market clearing in the








where K is the total mass of capital available in the global economy.Note
that, contrary to Krugman (1980) or Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), the mass
of ﬁrms in the global economy (N = nH + nF) changes with the spatial
allocation of capital between the two countries.In particular, the market
allows for the widest (resp., narrowest) range of varieties when the whole
amount of capital is allocated to the low (resp., large) ﬁxed requirement
country.
Finally, while good Z is costlessly traded, international shipments of any
variety of the diﬀerentiated good incur a trade cost of τ ≥ 0 units of good Z
per unit of variety shipped.As markets are spatially separated, we assume
that they are segmented, which means that ﬁrms are free to choose how
much to sell on each market independently (Haskel and Wolf, 2001).Even
within fairly well-integrated blocks, such as the EU or Canada/US, border
eﬀects remain strong (Head and Mayer, 2000; Engel and Rogers, 1996), thus
justifying our assumption.
Because consumers are indiﬀerent about the origin of varieties, all vari-
eties sold in each country may be treated in a symmetric way.Let qij denote
the quantity of a variety produced in country i bought by a consumer resid-
ing in country j.The inverse demands in countries H and F for a variety
produced in country H can then be expressed as follows:
pHH = α − (β − γ)qHH − γQH
pHF = α − (β − γ)qHF − γQF (2)
where Qi/N ≡ niqii+njqji is the average quantity of the diﬀerentiated good
sold in country i = H,F and j  = i.Due to perfect competition in the Z-
sector, pZ
i = wi = pZ for i = H,F.1 This makes good Z a convenient choice
for the num´ eraire so that wi = pZ =1 .
Turning to the diﬀerentiated good, because of increasing returns to scale
and no economies of scope each ﬁrm produces one and only one variety.In
our setting, ﬁrms play a noncooperative game with a continuum of players
in which quantities are the ﬁrms’ strategies.Note that one of the main
advantages of monopolistic competition is that the distinction between price
1Such factor price equalization always holds when each country has enough labor to
support some production of Z for any international allocation of capital, which we assume
to hold.
5competition and quantity competition becomes immaterial.Indeed, being
negligible to the market, each ﬁrm behaves as a monopolist on its residual
demand, which makes it indiﬀerent between using price or quantity as a
strategy.
Firms in country H maximize their proﬁt given by
ΠH = θ(pHH − m)qHH +( 1− θ)(pHF − m − τ)qHF − rHφH (3)
with respect to qHH and qHF independently.Because each ﬁrm is negligible
to the market, it has no impact on the two indices QH and QF.
Hence, maximizing (3) yields the following proﬁt-maximizing outputs:
qHH(QH)=






Symmetric expressions hold for country-F ﬁrms.Although each ﬁrm is
negligible so that its output does not change aggregate market conditions,
those conditions inﬂuence each ﬁrm’s optimal strategy.Using (4) as well as
the expressions of output aggregates, the (Nash) equilibrium intranational
and international quantities are:
q∗
HH =
2(β − γ)(α − m)+γ(1 − λ)Nτ







Using the equilibrium quantity aggregates Q∗
H and Q∗
F, it is readily veriﬁed
that the demands (2) can be expressed as follows:
p∗
HH =( β − γ)q∗
HH + mp ∗
FH =( β − γ)q∗
FH + m + τ. (6)
For bilateral trade to occur for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, international demands
evaluated must be positive.This is satisﬁed when
τ<
2(α − m)(β − γ)
2(β − γ)+γN
(7)
which we assume to hold in subsequent developments.Note that (7) implies
that α − m − τ>0.
Plugging the equilibrium quantities into (3) and equating proﬁts to zero















stand for the rental rate diﬀerential of capital between countries H and F,
which is a continuous function of the capital distribution λ.
3 The market outcome
So far, we have described the optimal choices of consumers and ﬁrms for a
given spatial allocation λ of capital.We now complete the characterization of
the spatial equilibrium by determining the value of λ for which no agent has
an incentive to change her allocation of capital.Because capital is perfectly
mobile, its rental rate must be equalized across countries at any interior
equilibrium 0 <λ ∗ < 1: rH(λ∗)=rF(λ∗) or, equivalently, ∆r∗(λ∗)=0 .
Unfortunately, the solution with arbitrary ﬁxed costs φH and φF turns
out to be especially cumbersome.This leads us to focus on the special, but
relevant, case in which the ﬁxed requirements of capital needed to launch a
ﬁrm only slightly diﬀer between the two countries: φH ≡ φ + ε and φF ≡
φ−ε, where |ε| is very small.In the present context, ε may be interpreted as
a mean-preserving measure of the set-up cost diﬀerential between countries
H and F.Formally, this is equivalent to a small and symmetric perturbation
of φH and φF around the identical technology case.
We deﬁne a spatial equilibrium λ∗
ε associated with the perturbation ε as
a solution to the equation ∆r∗(λ,ε) = 0.Such an equilibrium exhibits a
HME when the country with the larger share of consumption expenditure
hosts an even larger share of ﬁrms (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).Formally,











F are derived from (1) at the spatial equilibrium distribu-
tion of capital.As shown by Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), the symmetric-
technology spatial equilibrium λ∗















The ﬁrst inequality holds since 2(α−m)−τ>0 whenever international trade
occurs.Hence, in the symmetric-technology case the larger country hosts a
7more than proportional share of the imperfectly competitive industry, thus
conﬁrming Helpman and Krugman’s (1985) ﬁnding.
Our aim in the remainder of this section is to assess how the spatial
equilibrium changes under a small asymmetry ε in ﬁxed costs.Formally,
we investigate how the asymmetric-technology spatial equilibrium λ∗
ε, as-
sociated with ε, compares with λ∗
0.Somewhat unexpectedly, two opposite
eﬀects are at work.First, when ε>0, set-up costs in country H (resp.,
F) become larger (resp., lower), thus making country H less attractive for
any given distribution λ of capital.Second, the total mass of varieties in the
economy decreases with ε in the vicinity of ε = 0.Indeed, diﬀerentiating the
total mass of ﬁrms











(φ + ε)2 +
(1 − λ)K
(φ − ε)2 .
When ε = 0, the sign of this derivative depends on the sign of (1−2λ)K/φ2.
As shown by (10), this is always negative at the spatial equilibrium λ∗
0 when
country H is larger than country F.Stated diﬀerently, the decrease in the
number of ﬁrms in H exceeds the increase observed in F.Everything else
being equal, this makes country H (resp., F) less (resp., more) competi-
tive, thus raising (resp., lowering) local ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts. Clearly,
the equilibrium spatial distribution of ﬁrms accounts for these two opposite
eﬀects.
The diﬀerential ∆r∗ corresponding to φH ≡ φ+ε and φF ≡ φ−ε depends




























ε,ε) = 0 and ∆r∗(λ∗














Hence, for ε suﬃciently small, the sign of λ∗
ε −λ∗
0 is given by the sign of the






2(β − γ)φ[Kγ +2 ( β − γ)φ]
< 0. (13)
Thus, it remains to determine to sign of ∂ (∆r∗)/∂ε in order to compare
λ∗
ε and λ∗
0.Standard calculations, developed in the Appendix, show that
∂ (∆r∗)/∂ε < 0 for all admissible parameter values when θ>1/2.Hence,
we have shown the following result:
Proposition 1 For a suﬃciently small ε R 0, λ∗
ε Q λ∗
0 for all values of
θ ≥ 1/2 and for all values of τ satisfying (7).
The economic intuition underlying this proposition is as follows.When
ε>0, say, the total mass of ﬁrms in the economy decreases which, ceteris
paribus, tends to raise the equilibrium prices and operating proﬁts in both
countries (via a standard pro-competitive eﬀect).Yet, the return per unit
of capital employed in the larger country H rises less (or even falls) than
that in the smaller country F, because of the larger capital requirement.
This triggers a reallocation of capital from the larger to the smaller country,
thereby raising prices and operating proﬁts in the former, while decreasing
them in the latter.Capital market clearing then implies that the share of
ﬁrms in country F rises, whereas that in country H falls.3 Note ﬁnally
that, by continuity, the HME still arises when ε is suﬃciently small.Stated
diﬀerently, when asymmetries in ﬁxed costs are not too important, the larger
country still hosts a more than proportional share of the mobile industry.
Let us conclude this section by brieﬂy pointing out what may happen
when ε>0 takes larger values.As mentioned above, the analytical treat-
ment of the general case appears to be too cumbersome to lead to a clear-cut
2This comes from (12) and the continuity of λ
∗
ε with respect to ε.
3As shown by Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), a similar eﬀect arises when the two
countries have diﬀerent tax rates on the returns to capital, the country having the higher
tax rate loosing ﬁrms. Yet, the tax-game outcome is still such that the larger country
hosts a more than proportionate industry share. Note that in our setting the mass of
ﬁrms is no longer ﬁxed, which allows for additional competition eﬀects as the total size of
the industry changes.
9answer.However, the analysis of the following numerical example suﬃces to
show that a reverse HME may arise.Let α =2 ,β =1 ,γ =0 .7, K =5 ,
φ =1 ,m =0 .3, τ =0 .2 and θ =0 .6.One can verify that n∗
H/n∗
F −θ/(1−θ)
is a decreasing function of ε even for large perturbations.As stated above,
the HME still holds when the set-up costs in the two countries are suﬃ-
ciently similar because λ∗
0 − θ>0.However, once the gap in set-up costs
becomes suﬃciently large,the country hosting the larger share of ﬁrms may
be the small one.In our numerical example, this happens should the small
country have set-up costs about more than ε>0.093 less than the large
one.
4 What is the optimal policy?
In what follows, we superscript the ﬁrst-best values of the variables with f.





















with Γ ≡ β +( N − 1)γ>0.Because utilities are quasi-linear, they are
transferable so that the planner maximizes the following (utilitarian) social
welfare function:
W(λ,ε)=θSH(λ,ε)+( 1− θ)SF(λ,ε)+λKrH(λ,ε)
+(1 − λ)KrF(λ,ε) + constant.
Marginal cost pricing implies that pHH = pFF = m and pHF = pFH = m+τ,
which then yields rH = rF = 0.Setting prices equal to marginal costs,
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) show that the ﬁrst-best spatial allocation
















whenever θ ≥ 1/2.This shows that the market outcome yields too much
agglomeration in the larger country with respect to the ﬁrst-best, so that the
welfare-maximizing planner will choose an allocation of capital that is closer
to symmetry than the market outcome.Besides the standard production
10and consumption distortions under imperfect competition, another cause
of ineﬃciency is that ﬁrms face a lower elasticity of demand in the larger
market in the presence of trade costs.Firms, therefore, dump their product
into the other country, which leads to wasteful trade in the presence of trade
costs.
In this section, we revisit the ﬁrst-best outcome in the presence of small
asymmetries in ﬁxed costs.More precisely, we assume that the planner is
able to: (i) set prices equal to marginal costs and use lump sum transfers
to compensate ﬁrms for losses; and (ii) to choose the spatial allocation λf










stand for the welfare maximizing mass of ﬁrms in the two countries when
the diﬀerence in ﬁxed costs is given by 2εf.Clearly, εf = 0 corresponds to
the case in which there are no diﬀerences in technologies and set-up costs
between the two countries.As shown by (14), this never corresponds to a
welfare-maximizing choice.The question is then: will the planner choose
ε>0 and favor the smaller country, or will he choose ε<0 and favor the
larger country?
Given the result in (14), one might think that the answer implies εf > 0
because the ﬁrst-best involves less agglomeration than the market outcome.
Yet, as shown in the previous section, choosing ε>0 reduces the total mass
of varieties in the global economy.Since consumers value variety, this is
welfare-deteriorating.Clearly, the optimal allocation ( λf,ε f) encapsulates
both eﬀect and solves the trade-oﬀ between product variety and spatial
inequality.




(λf,ε f) = 0 (15)
∂W
∂ε
(λf,ε f)=0 . (16)
As in the previous section, we focus on the case of suﬃciently small values
of ε.
To begin with, note that the unique solution to condition (15) with ε =0
is given by (14).Substituting this solution into condition (16) yields, after





(β − γ)(2θ − 1)(2ξ − τ)φ
4Kγτ
{(Kγτ)2 +2 K(β − γ)γτ2φ
+( β − γ)2[16ξ(1 − θ)θ(ξ − τ)+( 1+4 ( 1− θ)θ)τ2]φ2} < 0
where the inequality results from θ>1/2 and the trade feasibility condition
ξ ≡ α − m − τ>0.This proves the following:
Proposition 2 The symmetric technology case εf =0is never a welfare-
maximizing choice. Furthermore,the planner chooses some εf < 0 and,
therefore,favor more agglomeration in the larger country.
Proposition 2 suﬃces to show that the negative impact of decreased
variety more than oﬀsets the positive impact of a more even spatial con-
ﬁguration.As can be seen from the expression of ∂W/∂ε, the symmetry vs
variety trade-oﬀ vanishes when both countries have approximately the same
size (i.e., θ close to 1/2) and/or when products are almost homogenous (i.e.,
β−γ close to 0).In such circumstances, the variety eﬀect disappears and we
fall back on the ‘symmetric’ ﬁrst-best in which the planner chooses a more
even spatial distribution of industry.
This result also shows that when countries have diﬀerent sizes and con-
sumers have a love for variety, two conditions that are quite likely to hold,
the optimal spatial allocation of capital may well involve more agglomer-
ation in a ﬁrst-best setting when this allows for an increase in the mass
of varieties in the global economy, an eﬀect that is highlighted in regional
growth theory (see, e.g., Baldwin and Martin, 2004).
5 Concluding remarks
This note has two main implications.First, we have shown that spatial in-
equalities may be desirable when they lead to more product variety in a world
in which consumers exhibit a love for variety.Since the EU is committed to
an explicit social cohesion objective, as clearly spelled-out by Article 130a of
the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and shown by the importance of Structural
Funds, our results highlight once more that this equity objective is likely to
conﬂict with the search for global eﬃciency.Hence, the search for eﬃciency,
which has motivated for example the endorsement of the European Charter
for Small Enterprises at the Feira European Council in June 2000, may itself
interfere with the social cohesion objective of the Amsterdam Treaty.
12Second, when both technology diﬀerences and increasing returns inter-
act, the size eﬀect associated with the HME may actually not manifest itself
in the observed spatial equilibrium structure.More precisely, we have seen
that the advantage of the small country in terms of ﬁxed and set-up costs
impacts negatively on the HME by reducing the share of capital in the large
country.Stated diﬀerently, capital is naturally attracted to regions where it
may easily enter the market since this raises its per-unit return.Hence, ex
post we may observe that the more eﬃcient country is the net exporter of
the diﬀerentiated good even if its market size is quite small.This suggests
that controlling for diﬀerences in technology and barriers to entry should be
an important ingredient of empirical tests of the HME.
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Appendix:





for all admissible parameter values.Evaluating ∆ r∗ at the equilibrium prices












− 16(β − γ)3(1 − 2θ)2(2(m − α)+τ)2φ
+4 K(β − γ)2γ [8(α − m) ( 1+6 ( θ − 1)θ)(α − m − τ)
+ (1 + 12(θ − 1)θ)τ2  
,
14where
C =8 K(β − γ)γ[Kγ +2 ( β − γ)φ]2 > 0





2(β − γ)(2θ − 1)[2(m − α)+τ]2[3Kγ +4 ( β − γ)φ]
Kγ[Kγ +2 ( β − γ)φ]2 > 0
since θ>1/2, thus showing that the derivative of ∆r∗ with respect to ε is
increasing in θ.Note that, as shown by (10), λ∗
0 > 1 when θ = 1.Since this
is impossible because λ ≤ 1, in order to evaluate the derivative of ∆r∗ with
respect to ε at θ = 1, we have to recalculate this derivative by substituting
λ∗










Since ∆r∗ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to ε, since the
derivative is increasing with respect to θ, and since it is negative for θ =1 ,
we may conclude that it is negative for all admissible parameter values and
all 1/2 <θ≤ 1.This proves our claim.
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